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Abstract
The main objective of this paper is to highlight the fundamental and pioneering
contributions made by S.C. Kolm in the area of traditional public economics. Most of
them have been published in French over a decade (from the mid sixties to the mid
seventies) and they illustrate, at best, the tradition of the French school of "ingenieurs
economistes". They had a profound impact on the carrier of the second author and his
desire to become an economist. It is a pleasure for him to recognize this intellectual
inuence and to pay his tribute.
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1 Introduction
Serge-Christophe Kolm has made important contributions to many dierent areas of public
economics. Some of his books and papers have benecited from a large audience as they
were translated from French into English or published in English in international scientic
journals. This is the case for instance of most of his articles and monographs on the theory
of justice and inequality measurement. Unfortunately, as for an iceberg, this part of his
scientic output dissimulates another part which was his main research area from the mid
sixties to the mid seventies and is, unfortunately, not as known as it should be from the rest of
the community. While also normative, these contributions dier from his later contributions
in that eld of economics both in terms of motivations and objects. As we will see, he was
very much concerned and interested by the rationale(s) for a public sector intervention and
the qualitative and quantitative features of the optimal public policy with a major focus on
the rules for an ecient management of public organizations.
The following sample of citations illustrates1 his perspective : " L'economie politique est
fondamentalement une science normative. So but nal est de conseiller des actions. A qui
? parfois a des entreprises, parfois a une classe sociale, mais le plus souvent a une etat. Or
si on peut aller assez loin dans l'analyse positive du secteur prive pour n'en deduire qua la
n des actions publiques a entreprendre ou a ne pas faire, dans l'etude du secteur public la
plupartdes variables speciques rencontrees sont instrumentales pour ce centre de decision
lui-me^me. En consequence, l'optique normative est beaucoup plus repandue dans toute
l'economie publique que dans l'analyse des mecanismes de marche. L'economie publique
recherche donc les actions et l'organisation optimale du secteur public"2..."L'economie nor-
mative est la branche de l'economie politique qui dit ce qui doit e^tre fait. Ell est surtout utile
pour l'economie publique en indiquant les actions optimales de l'etat...."3" Ces principes se
manifestent d'abord dans cette branche nouvelle de l'economie politique qu'est l'economie
publique. celle ci- a pour ta^che d'analyser le ro^le economique et de denir les comporte-
ments socialement optimaux, de l'etat, du secteur public, et de toutes les institutions de
nature plus ou moins politiques. Puisque "laissez-fair" est toujours une des solutions pos-
sibles du probleme normatif "que faire?" pose, l'economie publique doit commencer par
1We wish we could bring more evidence of Kolm's main interest in the subject and the intellectual and
practical origins of such concern. Due to a lack od space, we cannot provide a very detailed report on these
aspects. We strongly recommend reading the introduction of Kolm (1971a) which contains a complete and
nice description of the approach as well as chapter 2 of the same book which contains "le dialogue du liberal
et du dirigiste", a truly monumental piece of pedagogy.
2Kolm (1971c) on pages 3-4.
3Kolm (1971b), on page 395.
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determiner quelles activites doivent e^tre realisees par ces organismes et lesquelles doivent
e^tre laissees au marche.........Theorique cet ouvrage a un but eminement pratique : montrer
comment doivent e^tre geres et produits les services consideres et les biens qui les rendent.
C'est donc une etude d'economie normative, ou prescriptive, qui cherche et expose le choix
optimal pour la societe dans diverses situations. Les variables instrumentales a determiner
sont les qualites, les quantites, le mode de production, l'allocation, l nancement, la nature
institutionnelle de ces activites. L'allocation peut e^tre quantitative ou par vente a des prix
ou tarifs. Dans ce dernier cas, elle fournit au moins une partie du nancement, et le fait qu'il
reste ou non un decit est essentiel pour la question de la decentralisation du management
de cette activite.."4
Among other things, he has written many papers on public utility pricing and more
generally on the nature and role of "public" prices in economies displaying various forms
of imperfections and subsequently likely to perform poorly on the allocation and distribu-
tion fronts. Kolm (1971a) oers a very nice and stimulating presentation of the problems
faced by public utilities and the so-called "services publics"5 : " Les prix des "grands ser-
vices publics inquietent la population, forcent les gouvernants a des choix diciles, ....Dans
quelles proportions la radiodiusion, la television, les musees, les orchestres, les theatres, etc,
doivent-ils e^tre nances par l'etat, par les spectateurs ou auditeurs (droits d'entree, taxes sur
recepteurs ou paiement plus specique possible de la reception),..... Le budget de la SNCF
doit-il e^tre equilibre ? Cet equilibre n'est-il pas le critere et le moyen d'une saine gestion ?....
N'est-il pas injuste que l'ensemble des contribuables francais subventionnenet les parisiens
en comblant le decit de la RATP, ce qui, de plus, encourage l'engorgement de la capitale
?.....Pourquoi l'enseignement superieur ne se nancerait-il pas lui-me^me en faisant payer les
etudiants qui auraient par ailleurs acces a des pre^ts a long terme ?". He is aware of the
fact that the frontier between private and public institutions is sometimes tiny and in any
case dicult, if not impossible, to draw :"On a coutume d'opposer public et prive. en fait,
l'administration pure et l'entreprise purement privee ne sont que deux po^les entre lesquels
s'etend une vaste plage continue d'organismes divers, plus ou moins proches de l'un ou de
l'autre, intermediares entre eux de facon variees : entreprises nationalisees, administrations
vendant leurs services, services autonomes, regies, concessions,....."6.
4Kolm (1971a) on pages 20-21 and 23.
5The terminology "services des masses" used in Kolm (1971a) refers to services which represent an
important part of the consumption of everybody in the economy. On page 23, he writes "Le telephone,
l'enseignement collectif, la poste, les transports par route, rail ou air, les adductions d'eau et d'electricite,
la distribution par centres commerciaux, la radiodiusion et la television, les services hospitaliers, la voirie,
l'egout, l'embellissement des villes, la plupart des services administratifs en constituent des cas typiques".
6Kolm (1971c) on pages 6-8.
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This research is materialized by a very rich and voluminous production which is listed
at the end of this paper. The main motivation and "raison d'e^tre" of our paper is to
contribute to their diusion as much as we can as we think these papers represent at best
an intellectual tradition in public economics quite active in France under the impulse of the
"ingenieurs economistes". In addition to this historical exploration of one epoch of Kolm's
itinerary, we would like to emphasize the modernity of his approach and results as well as
the creativity and the large spectrum of methods and concepts he was able to invent and(or)
use along this way. The paper is divided in two parts.
The rst part consists in an historical presentation of some of his main ideas and achieve-
ments on several issues relative to the optimal management of the public sector or part of
it. This part pursues two objectives. On one hand, we want to show how Kolm's works were
in the continuation of the work of his precursors in the community of French "ingenieurs
economistes" . These economists display several common features. The name "ingenieur
economiste" refers to the fact that they all went through the major engineering schools
("grandes ecoles") and received there (and before) a solid education in science as well as
in engineering. In addition to this background and to the resulting willingness to adopt
a scientic approach of economic problems , many of them did belong to the research and
executive divisions of the nationalized industries or the administration.Their interest for eco-
nomics and the topics on which they were more inclined to work originated in these practical
concerns and the continued interaction between theory and practice has been a remarkable
feature of these developments. This certainly does not mean that they were simply applying
existing economic principles without creating or inventing anything on their own. In fact,
many important papers in theoretical public economics have been written by some of those
people. The point that we want to make here is that the source of inspiration of the problem,
which was leading to a theoretical "detour" and a pure research output, according to usual
academic standards, was their professional activity and the various challenges, debates and
policy issues resulting from their duties. As employees of the public sector, they had indeed
to come with responses to questions that were raised. In doing so however, and this is the
second point that I want to stress, they looked for a response based on a solid and coher-
ent theoretical formulation of the problem under scrutiny. These culture and practice dier
strongly from the "culture" of some other civil servants wore willing to depart from these de-
manding principles and to base their recommendation on so-called intuitive principles. The
fact that Kolm belongs to the rst group not only appears in his work but in the following ci-
tations. He writes for instance "Gra^ce a une pleiade de grands homes la methode scientique
investit peu a peu l'economie politique au long du XIX ieme siecle, et celle-ci s'y conver-
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tit completement des la n de la seconde guerre mondiale. En consequence, l'economie se
detache maintenant tres loin en avant de toutes les autres soit-disant sciences sociales dans
la voie de la scientisation..."7 and "Malheureusement les hommes de la politique, de la
presse, de l'administationou des aaires tranchent de facon extre^mement supercielle, en
ne considerant qu'un aspect du probleme et en negligeant les autres. mais comme chacun
monte en epingle un eet dierent, les solutions preconisees s'opposent souvent a l'extre^me.
et comme aucun ne peut conviancre scientiquement les autres dans le dilaogue d sourds qui
s'etablit, chacun erige son idee en principe pour eviter d'avoir a en discuter les fondations...et
defend sa position comme s'il s'agissait d'un eoption politique, la force de conviction servant
de substitut a la profondeur de l'analyse"8.
This historical presentation is organized around the principle of marginal cost pricing.
As we could not cover everything, we had to make a choice. this choice of course had to be
representative of a both his interests and style. We think that that selection is appropriate
as, not only this principle is far more subtle that it look at rst glance, but also a door
to penetrate into the world of second-best public economics. There is no need to remind
here how important and useful is that principle in standard microeconomics. It is also
controversial when comes the time of application as its implementation raises a number
of diculties which have motivated some of Kolm's work as well as the works of some of
his precursors and successors. Like many of his contemporaries, Kolm contributed to the
analysis of that principle in showing how to use it in settings departing from usual ones and
also how to alter and (or) extend it when its direct application was obstructed by institutional
constraints. In derives the policy implications of this principle and its extensions in particular
on pricing the goods and services produced or regulated by the public sector.
As we will argue, Kolm is in some sense at the crossroad of two periods or waves in
the eld of public economics as practiced by the French "ingenieurs economistes". He comes
after very eminent precursors who made seminal contributions to theoretical microeconomics
and were able to provide solutions to several important policy issues which were on the top
of the agenda after world war II. But beyond this respect for this very respectable legacy,
he was aware of the limits and the necessity of extending. He contributed himself to that
but some of the tools from game theory and the economics of information were not yet
7In Kolm (1971a) on page 15-16. On page 1(, footnote 2 contains a very severe criticism of the French
economists appointed by universities. For him the mediocrity of those economists is however compensated by
the work of the "ingenieurs economistes" as he writes "Alors que quelques ingenieurs et scientiques francais
reconvertis a l'economie ont realises les meilleurs travaux du monde dans leur domaines (Allais, Boiteux,
Debreu-un exile-, mmalinvaud et certains autres, l'economie universitaire ocielle francaise reste la risee du
monde...".
8Kolm (1971c) on page 8.
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well developed. While very ahead of his times, some of his contributions pave the way
to the modern approach in terms of incentive constraints and mechanism design. We will
show how this has been analysed and explored by his successors. They were able to oer
a deep understanding of the limits of the marginal cost principle from dierent angles.
The terminology successors refer to several things. Many of them are also part of this
community of French "ingenieurs-economistes" and share the methods and concerns of their
predecessors : a strong belief in the usefulness of microeconomics and in the necessity of
basing policy recommendations on solid theoretical foundations. Some of these successors
mostly specialize into the examination of the theory and its extensions while some others.
In contrast to the precursors who were themselves directed confronted to the management
problems of the public sector, the successors are facing a new age or period characterized by
a (de) regulation process of huge parts of the public sector. To accompagny this process in
providing helpful guidelines and principles to managers, regulators and public policy makers
is the current challenge of real world public economics.
The paper aims to oer a brief description of Kolm's scientic record in public economics
from a historical perspective. It is divided in two parts. In a rst part, we argue that the
choice of the topics as well as the methodology were very much in the continuation of what
was done in France since World War II under the leadership of the French engineers. Then, in
a second part, we will show how this tradition has been pursued in many new and important
directions without any major and discontinuous change in the method and the agenda. To
some extent, Kolm is in between two periods and has played a major role with respect to
both : he has extended the results of his precursors and applied their methods to many new
areas and he has also prepared the grounds for the successors through several papers where
he has anticipated some of the questions which are or has been at the forefront of the more
recent scientic agenda.
2 The Precursors
In many countries, the production and distribution of several important economic (private)
goods and services is under the control of the public sector. In addition, the government
contracts with private rms to supply goods and services, both directly to itself and to
individuals We are not going to review the list of arguments which support the view that the
government should control these specic activities. The most widely heard is that private
rms pursue the maximization of protes of their owners, and not the welfare of the nation.
But we know that private rms, in pursuing their narrow self-interest in competitive markets,
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can be thought of as pursuing the public interest. There is not necessarily a conict between
the pursuit of private interests and what is in the public interest. However, when markets
failures occur, rms 'pursuit of prot maximization might not result in an ecient resource
allocation.
The most important market failure that has led to public production arises when market
are not competitive. A common reason that markets may not be competitive is the existence
of increasing returns to scale. In that case, economic eciency requires that there be a limited
number of rms. Industries where increasing returns are so signicant that only one rm
should operate in any region are referred to as natural monopolies9. In these situations, we
cannot rely on competitive forces to ensure that the industry is ecient. Eciency require
that price equal marginal cost. But if the rm charges marginal price, it will suer a loss
since marginal cost is lower than average cost10.
Once it is admitted that some form of public intervention is needed, a number of questions
arise : what should be the principles to guide the production/investment decisions of the
rms in charge of these activities and what should the pricing rules to be used ? In case of
a decit, how the revenues required to pay this loss are to be raised ? When the natural
monopoly produces several commodities (multi-product), the pricing question becomes more
complex and a number of new issues emerge mostly because some inputs are common to
the production of all of the services. In such setting, we may, for instance, wonder if any
departure from the marginal cost pricing principle should apply uniformly to all commodities
and services or else if higher charges on some services could be used to subsidy other services.
These matters were the questions faced by a group of French economists just after World
War II. As reported by Dreze (1964) : "During World War II two graduates from the "Ecole
Polytechnique", Maurice Allais and Pierre Masse, renewed a long tradition of contributions
to mathematical economics started by Cournot and the engineer Dupuit a hundred of years
before and more recently maintained by such well-known econometricians as F. Divisia and
R. Roy.... Shortly after the war, the problems of reconstruction and of management of the
newly nationalized industries (electricity, gas, coal mining) gave Allais, Masse, and their
colleagues, students and followers ample opportunities for applying and developing their
theories.......The continued interaction between theory and practice has been another re-
markable feature of these developments. While the pure theorist Allais was consulted about
the management of the coal mines, Masse or Boiteux, who had executive responsabilities
9In his mathematical derivation of the conditions for a Pareto optimum,, Allais (1945) allows explicitely
for the existence of two sectors : a competitive sector and a sector composed of natural and other monopolies.
10Stiglitz (1988) oers a nice simple exposition of this failure as well as the limits of the threat of entry.
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at EDF, developed original contributions to decision or price theory....By then what has
sometimes been referred to as the French "marginalist" or "mathematical" school was born;
an important stream of scientif activity was under way that has developed continuously ever
since......This development has taken place largely outside the traditional professional circles
and channels. Members of this school did and do belong to the stas of the engineering
schools or statistics departments, to the rsearch as well as the executive division of the na-
tionalized industries, or to the administration.....The theorists and the executives share the
view that there is no sound policy unless it is based upon a sound theory, whereas empirical
relevance and verication make for sound theories. The fact that so much work has been
motivated by empirical problems and that it eventually led to practical implications may
partly account for the soundeness of the theories".
I would like to see the contributions of the French engineers as an intellectual response
to the questions raised by the public management of natural monopolies11
 "Much of the success of the French marginalist school in solving dicult practical
problems in this area rests ultimately upon a sound and sometimes subtle understanding
of the classical marginal cost concepts". The precursors have concentrated most on their
attention on the pricing and investment issues. Here, I will mostly focus on the pricing issue.
It is not as simple as it may look at rst glance. On the cost side, it is by no means clear that
the managers should value inputs according to market prices. If there are some distorsions
in the rest of the economy (in particular if there are some dierences between consumption
and production prices), the shadow prices reecting the true social cost or value of these
inputs may dier from the market prices. While aware of these issues, it is fair to recognize
that the precursors have not truly investigated the question of the adequate vector of prices
to evaluate the cost of inputs. While implicit in the conduct of various cost-benet analysis
of public projects (in particular when deciding which rate of discount to be used), the topic
was not ( at that time) subject to a systematic exploration for itself. Instead, given such a
vector of input prices, the attention was on the determination of the total (long-term and
short-term, average and marginal,...) cost curves of the multi-product public rm. We will
denote by C the total (long-term or short term, depending upon the context) cost function
of the public rm :
C = C(q1; q2; ::::; qK) (1)
11The papers collected in Vingt Cinq Ans d'Economie Electrique oer a nice overview of these contributions
together with their motivations.
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where q = (q1; q2; ::::; qK) 2 <K+ denotes the vector of outputs of the rm. Once these
curves have been calculated, we are in position to provide answers to the questions raised by
these economists : What are the optimal levels of investments (plant sizes and designs) and
prices ? In a rst best world ( all markets are opened, lump-sum transfers are feasible policy
instruments, no distorsions and "pathological" behavior in the rest of the economy,....), selling
products according to their marginal cost is a necessary condition for social optimality. In
the case where a pricing policy is a vector of linear prices p = (p1; p2; ::::; pK) 2 <K+ , optimal
prices and quantities are therefore related by the following equations :
pk =
@C
@qk
(q) for all k = 1; :::; K (2)
It follows that once we have been able to determine the cost function(s), we are in position
to compute the optimal prices. This means that the work has been transfered from economics
to operations research, applied mathematics and statistics. Indeed, the cost function is not
a primitive of the problem but instead the result of an optimization which can turn to be
more or less complicated. The area of operations research relevant to proceed depends upon
the nature of the variables : linear and non-linear programming, dynamic programming,
integer programming and combinatorial optimization,......In any case, the description of the
variables and constraints of the problems calls for a solid understanding of the technological
alternatives that could be considered and, in that respect, being an engineer was certainly a
good preparation. In fact, it seems that the entire task has truly two dierent components :
 First, we need a comprehensive description of the commodity space : What is the
relevant value of K ?
 Second, we then need an extensive analysis of the technologies from an engineering
perspective.
The rst task should not be neglected. It should be reminded that from the perspective
of an economist, a commodity or service is not simply described by its physical attributes
and characteristics but also by the time/period, the place and the contingencies of delivery.
The cost of serving customers may display important dierences according to the period and
(or) place of delivery. Besides a direct concern due to investment/storage possibilities and
availability of some natural ressources, distinctions based upon temporal considerations play
an important role as soon as some factors can be used for the production of the output(s) at
dierent periods. Distinctions based on spatial considerations also play a critical role as soon
as some transportation cost is involved in addition to production costs : the derivation of the
cost function in the case where the clients are located on a true geographic network are known
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to be among the hardest problems in operations research. Finally, as soon as uncertainty is
part of the problem, the denition of the commodity/service calls for a detailed description
of the conditions under which delivery will ultimately take place. The combination of the
three dimensions may lead to a rather large commodity space : one unit of electricity may
be priced dierently according to the period of the year which is considered, the location of
the client and the clauses of delivery originating, for instance, in the choice of interruptibility
standards.
As already alluded to, the French engineers were certainly well prepared and talented
to conduct the second task with success and making their ideas operational. Their work
is a perfect illustration of the derivation what has been called by Chenery (1949) engineer-
ing production functions. Instead of using statistical data, the promotors of this approach
suggest to use engineering data. As noted by Chenery " Industry studies have generally
used statistically determined cost curves. Since these curves are based of necessity upon
productive combinations which it has proved feasible to entrepreneurs to try out, they can-
not usualy tell us much about the broader range of productive possibilities which have been
explored experimentally but not adopted commercialy. The lack of this information is a
great handicap in many types of economic discussion......Before suggesting a way of using
engineering data in economic analysis, we must consider the problems which the engineer
himself is trying to solve. Since his initial aim is to discover all feasible ways of making a
given product or performing a given service, his rst concern is not with particular inputs
but with the nature of the chemical and physical transformations which are involved in the
productive process. he breaks down the process of production into convenient units whose
performance he attempts to describe by formulae based on the laws of physics and chemistry.
Since an elementary analysis in terms of the properties of each piece of equipment is often
impractical, the engineer must usually resort to testing various sizes and combinations of
equipment to determine the eect of such variable as size, speed, temperature, etc..upon
total performance. One basic dierence between engineering anlysis and economic analysis,
then, is the units which are considered fundamental. While the economists deals with plants
rms or industries, the engineer must deal primarily with separate physical processes.... If
the economist wishes to use engineering data to construct a production function, he must
go back to the intermediate stage in engineering calculation at which the various types of
inputs are considered. These data are founds in engineering textbooks. In order to use it con-
veniently, the economist must abandon his convention of using one-dimensional inputs and
use multi-dimensional inputs as the engineer does". The French engineers have applied this
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methodology12 with success to many dierent industries including for instance coal mining,
electricity, natural gas, and railways.
One spectacular application of marginal cost pricing is peak load pricing : it concerns
non-storable commodities with periodic demand uctuations (transportation, mail, telecom-
munications, power supply,...). It is based on a simple description of the commodity space
consisting in a division of the period of reference which is considered (say a year or a day)
into smaller periods (say months or day and night) : time is therefore considered as the
relevant dimension of dierentiation. An aggregate demand to the rm is a temporal prole
of consumptions: in electricity this vector is often represented (after rearrangement) as a
curve, the so-called load duration curve, as time is treated as a continuous variable. The
calculation of the cost curve based upon engineering data will be specic to the industry
which is considered. For instance, in the case of electricity, this amounts to the determination
of the optimal capacity conguration once the xed and operating cost of each conceivable
generating unit (coal, gas, nuclear, hydro,..) have been evaluated13. Let us consider the sim-
plest cost situation , namely, that dened by constant returns to scale, xed plant capacity
and short-term marginal costs that are constant and that do not depend upon plant size. It
is readily veried that the (short-term) total cost function per period is then :
c(q; z) =
(
z + bq if q  z
1 if q > z (3)
where q is the ouput per unit of time, z is the xed capacity,  is a marginal capacity
cost and b is a short-term (operating) marginal cost;  + b is then the long-term marginal
cost. For a temporal prole of consumptions q = (q1; q2; ::::; qK) where K is the number of
periods, we obtain the following (short-term) total cost function:
12This paper is obviously biased towards the contributions of French engineers as our priority here is
to point out the liation of Kolm. I confess that a deeper investigation would have produced a more
balanced evaluation of the impact of engineers on microeconomics and in particular on pricing and investment
problems, outside my home country. Chenery (1949) is a remarkable paper that should be read by anybody
interested in that area. Interestingly, he points out an analysis of air transport by Breguet (the famous French
aviator, airplane designer, and industrialist) summarized by Phelps-Brown (1936) who uses a technique to
derive a cost curve based on engineering experience. Stigler (1940) has also defended the advantages of the
engineering approach but the suggestion does not seem to have been taken up by economists at the time.
since then, many economists have argued against the statistical approach and used instead the engineering
approaach (see Marsden, Pingry and Whinston (1974) and the survey of Wibe (1984)).
13Approaches based on engineering and nancial data have also been used in settings dierent from cost
minimization. A quite remarkable illustration is Masse and Gibrat (1957) application of linear programming
to investment in the french electric power industry.
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C(q1; q2; ::::; qK ; z) =
8><>:
z + b
PK
k=1 qk if Sup
1kK
qk  z
1 if Sup
1kK
qk > z
In this problem, the non decomposability arises from the fact that there is an input (the
capacity here represents a plant or machine with a given size) that can be used repeatedly
for the production in all periods. Other channels of interdependence accross periods could
also be considered, like for instance through inventories. In the long run, the capacity will
be adjusted to the peak consumption. Boiteux (1949) and others have applied with success
the marginal cost principle to this setting.
Another set of applications of marginal cost pricing emerges when the heterogeneity
dimension is spatial instead of being temporal. As soon as some transportation cost must
be incurred prior to nal consumption, the derivation of the optimal transportation network
(sometimes, even, transportation and production activities are closely related) is a key feature
of the cost minimization operation. Besides the combinatorial design of "roads", the choice
of the dimension of pipes is also an important component of the transportation cost. As
noted by Chenery (1949), in the case of natural gas transportation, the amount of gas
transported by a pipe depends upon its diameter, the pressure of the gas, and the pressure
drop along the line. Hence capacity may be increased by either increasing the diameter, the
pipe thickness or the pumping capacity (which will depend upon the spacing of compressors
stations). Chenery uses an empirical relationship between these three engineering variables,
known as Weymouth's formula, together with some other basic relationships to determine
the cheapest transportation capacity. This is a perfect illustration of the relevance of the
engineering approach as in this particular spectrum of applications, the key ingredient is an
equation governing the ow of compressible uids through pipes.
Kolm has derived many ingenious and important implications of the marginal cost pricing
principle to several allocation problems. His book "Le Service des Masses" (1971) which is
part of his "Cours d'Economie Publique" is a perfect illustration of the intellectual tradition
of French engineers which has been briey described above. He has sometimes developed his
own general terminology in order to show the profound unity between problems which are
dierent only on the surface. Chapter 11 entitled "Structures varietales" is a discussion of the
commodity space : Kolm calls variete the specication of a commodity/service according
to the period, place or conditions of delivery. In many chapters, he also examines the
issues related to the cost side. Kolm (1971) is devoted to a class of problems where some
features describing the "quality" of one or several varietes/services produced by a public
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rm/administration are inuenced by the joint consumption of these services by the users.
Consider the case where K = 1 i.e. the situation where only one service is produced and let i
be an index to identify any particular consumer of this service. Let qi to denote the quantity
of service consumed by i, (q1; q2; ::::; qN) 2 <N+ to denote the vector of consumptions in the
population (where N is the number of consumers) and q  PNi=1 qi to denote the aggregate
consumption. The key concept introduced by Kolm in his book is the notion of "fonction
d'encombrement". In the case where the quality itself is one dimensional and denoted by w,
this function relates the level of quality w to the prole of consumptions (q1; q2; ::::; qN) and
a another vector z = (z1; z2; ::::; zM) describing the levels of M decision variables which are
often (according to Kolm) quantities of specic inputs.
w = w((q1; q2; ::::; qN); z)
He calls uniform the case where the "fonction d'encombrement" is anonymous i.e. such
that :
w = w(q; z) (4)
To illustrate how he derives the pricing application of marginal cost pricing, we consider
below the uniform case and we assume that M = 1. In his chapter 5, he derives the rst
order conditions for optimality. Let U i(qi; w) be a utility function describing, in monetary
units, the welfare derived by consumer i when he/she consumes qi units of the service with
a quality equal to w and let C(q; z) to denote the total cost incurred by the public rm to
produce a total quantity q and buy the input z.
Kolm demonstrates that the rst order optimality conditions are described by the equa-
tions :
@U i
@qi
(qi; w) =
@C
@q
(q; z)  @w
@q
(q; z)
0@ NX
j=1
@U j
@w
(qj; w)
1A for all i = 1; :::; N (5)
@C
@z
(q; z) =
@w
@z
(q; z)
0@ NX
j=1
@U j
@w
(qj; w)
1A (6)
The rst equation can be reformulated as :
13
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@qi
(qi; w) +
@w
@q
(q; z)
@U i
@w
(qi; w) =
@C
@q
(q; z)  @w
@q
(q; z)
0BB@ NX
j=1
j 6=i
@U j
@w
(qj; w)
1CCA (7)
which means that the marginal willingness to pay of user i for the consumption of this
service is equal to the marginal social cost which is the sum of the marginal cost of production
and the "external" marginal social cost. The combination of the two equations lead to the
following new equations :
@U i
@qi
(qi; w) =
@C
@q
(q; z) 
@w
@q
(q; z)
@w
@z
(q; z)
@C
@z
(q; z) for all i = 1; :::; N
In his chapter 6, Kolm derives the pricing rules which decentralize the optimal allocation.
It is simple to verify that to do so, the (linear) price pi of the service that should be paid by
user i must satisfy :
pi =
@C
@q
(q; z)  @w
@q
(q; z)
0BB@ NX
j=1
j 6=i
@U j
@w
(qj; w)
1CCA for all i = 1; :::; N (8)
We deduce from the above equations that optimal pricing is in general discriminatory.
As noted by Kolm, there is however an important case where discrimination vanishes. It
corresponds to the situation where the impact of a single user on aggregate consumption and
therefore on w can be considered as negligible. In such case, the optimal prices are uniform
accross users :
pi =
@C
@q
(q; z)  @w
@q
(q; z)
0@ NX
j=1
@U j
@w
(qj; w)
1A for all i = 1; :::; N (9)
and equivalently using (8) :
pi = p  @C
@q
(q; z) 
@w
@q
(q; z)
@w
@z
(q; z)
@C
@z
(q; z) for all i = 1; :::; N (10)
Besides uniformity, we note that the right-hand side consist of cost data and data on
the "fonction d'encombrement". Each specic problem will be described by a cost function
c and a "fonction d'encombrement" w. The cost function is a familiar concept while the
14
"fonction d'encombrement" is less so in economic analysis. It is very interesting to point out
that the engineering approach, that we have discussed extensively above, as a "marque de
fabrique" of the French engineers, seems to be perfectly suited to deal with this new notion.
In his chapter 7, entitled "Exemples", Kolm presents many practical problems for which
the abstract model described above is very convenient. His list of examples includes : road
transportation, railways transportation, stochastic congestion, trac accidents, pollutions
and queues. Let us say some few words on some of them to show (convincingly !) that
enginnering expertise cannot be avoided here. In the case of road transportation, he considers
the case of an highway with a number z of lines : q is the aggregate trac and w is the
average speed. Under some particular assumptions, Kolm derives the following technical
relationship between the three variables :
w(q; z) =
z   bq +
q
(z   bq)2   4acq2
2aq
where a, b and c are parameters. This "fonction d'encombrement " is quite special and
in fact, given a relationship between trac density and speed, the equation describing the
evolution of the trac ow is a complicated partial dierential equation. The analysis of
trac ows is a well dened area of applied mathematics and engineering sciences which is
obviously needed to apply marginal cost pricing to road congestion. An early analysis of
optimal tolls based on these principles and empirical "fonctions d'encombrement" is due to
Levy-Lambert (1968).
The case of stochastic congestion will be the topic of the second half of this paper. In
this setting, z represents the capacity of a given equipment and w denotes the reliability
level dened for instance as the probability of every customer having its demand satised.
The exact value of w will depend of the details of the stochastic model. This model applies
to many dierent industries : the delivery of electricity, gas, water may be interrupted or
rationned due for instance to adverse weather conditions, a power outage or a breakdown.
In banking, z represents the amount of total deposits of the bank and w the probability for a
client of being unable to withdraw some cash (Edgeworth (1888)). This case will be studied
extensively in the second part of this paper.
Queuing is a very important topic as for many many public administrations/ utilities a
demand which cannot be satised immediately can sometimes be delayed instead of being
cancelled. Waiting costs cannot however be ignored and the question of an optimal organi-
zation of the service taking into account these costs raises problems for which the framework
developed by Kolm (he calls it "encombrement d'attente") is very much appropriate. He
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devotes the last third of his book to the application of marginal cost pricing to this class of
problems. I am not aware of any similar systematic attempt. The relationship with engineer-
ing and operations research is obvious as reected for instance by the use of the mathematics
of queues when the arrival of new demands are described as Poisson processes.
In doing so and in order to examine the main features of the pricing rules which are
obtained, Kolm considers several properties of both the cost function c and the "fonction
d'encombrement" w. He makes a distinction between the property of "rendement quantitatif
constant" which applies to c and the important property of "rendement qualitatif constant"
which applies to w and asks for :
w(q; z) = 

q
z

His book contains many results14 on the relationships between the nancial consequences
of marginal cost pricing and the nature of the returns of the "fonction d'encombrement".
In his chapter 15, he also develops the notion of "capacity commune" as a key common
feature of the cost problems under consideration. It will play a critical role in the rest of this
paper and has already appeared in formula (). In his terminology, we will have a situation
of common capacity when the same input (equipment, machine,...), can be used to produce
several "varietes" of the same service as long as the limit is not reached. He writes nicely
"la capacite commune est a la fois une consommation privative entre consommateurs de la
me^me variete et une consommation collective entre consommations de varietes dierentes".
In this chapter, he also states some conditions satised by such optimal capacity.
This section on marginal cost pricing has privileged the French contribution as I wanted
to illustrate how Kolm's contributions were positionned in the continuation of this intel-
lectual tradition. This could leave the reader with the impression that on one hand only
French engineers were actively participating to these developments and that, on the other
hand, there was some unanimity upon the fact that this pricing policy was the right one to
implement as soon as competitive markets could not be designed to produce and distribute
this commodity/service. In light of these questions, I would like to conclude this paragraph
by some brief comments.
According to Coase (1970), Hotelling (1938) should certainly be credited for being among
the rst to suggest the use of marginal cost pricing for public utilities and enterprises for
modern discussion. Hotelling recognizes the major inuence of Dupuit. In the U.K., the
major event was the appearance of Meade (1944) (which rst came out as a paper of the
14I will not discuss here his analysis of optimal investment policies in a truly dynamic framework.
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economic section of the Cabinet Oce as part of how state enterprises ought to be run,
with no thought of publication but (due to the enthusiasm of Keynes both as adviser of the
treasury and editor) as part of a symposium in the Economic Journal) where he defends
strongly the idea of marginal cost pricing; Fleming wrote "the proposal for marginal cost
pricing is not, I think, open to serious criticism". In the meantime, Meade had become
head of the economic section of the Cabinet Oce and a paper was prepared setting out
the policy which it was considered ought to be followed in the nationalized industries, and
this included a suggestion for adopting marginal cost pricing. According to Coase, "This
proposal was not, hovever accepted by the minister concerned and marginal cost pricing
has played no part in the pricing policies of the nationalized industries. As it happens,
pricing policies in the nationalized industries have tended to develop in ways I nd very
congenial, and some of the most interesting work of which I know in the eld of pricing is
being conducted in the nationalized electricity supply in Britain. The nationalized industries
have in fact followed a completely dierent line from that suggested by the marginal cost
pricing proposal as originally conceived, and in the meantime, of course, enthusiasm in the
profession for marginal cost pricing has become less pronounced".
In the U.S., research was also active on these ideas. Some economists have expressed a
strong enthusiasm regarding the work accomplished by the French engineers and their ability
to make operational these ideas while some others have formulatedexpress dissent from the
view that price should be made equal to marginal cost. Among the advocates, Nelson (1963),
for instance, writes "The word "Applications" in my title has shrunk all the way from plural
to singular. For so far as I know, the only public utility enterprise in the world to proceed
from the theory of marginal cost pricing to both a schedule of rates and a series of rules for
investment policy is Electricite de France". He presents an outline of marginal cost pricing
as applied by E.D.F. Few years earlier, Marschak (1960) also oers a very complete and lucid
analysis of their contribution. He writes "It is only recently that American economists have
begun major eorts to apply welfare economics to the decisions of specic public enterpreises.
they have principally chosen the diicult eld of water-resource policy , one of the very few
important areas of American public enterprise where such eorts are feasible. In France,
on the other hand, where the post war public sector includes important basic industries, a
major share of economists's output since the war has concerned the application of welfare
economics principles to policy-making in these industries.......The French theoretical work
on investment choice parallels recent American discussion; the work on peak load pricing
antedates recent American results; and some of the work on optimal pricing under the
no-decit constraint has no American counterpart.........The French's economists' practical
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success ought to encourage those American economists who have been urging American
public enterprises to adopt policies closer to those which the eciency conditions of welfare
economics imply". However, it is interesting to note that Marschak identies three classes of
diculties in accepting and applying this solution. While aware of the diculties resulting
from its application, Vickrey (1948)(1955) has been an important supporter of marginal
cost pricing and has made important applications of these ideas to the pricing of public
transportation. Among the opponents, Coase (1946) was certainly among the most active.
Clemens (1941) had already expressed a dissent and in his discussion of Nelson (1963), he
writes "I am rather skeptical on marginal cost pricing proposals as commonly put forth. In
my mind they are oversimplied. If the assumptions are granted, one cannot quarel with
the theory, but the assumptions are such as to make the applicability in practice extremely
questionable. The tarif vert is a more sophisticated version of marginal cost pricing but one
which is nevertheless subject to some of the usual inrmities". He lists eight inrmities. Both
Marschak's three classes of diculties and Clemens's eight inrmities ( and to some extent
many reservations expressed by the strongest opponents) are mostly motivated by second
best considerations. Besides these considerations that will be discussed more extensively in
the next subsection, both allude to the enormous practical diculties of satisfactorily dening
and measuring the relevant marginal cost in the face of indivisibilities, uncertainties, joint
products, the possibility of expanding or expanding various elements of plant over varying
time periods, etc,". In that respect, it is interesting to point out some conict among the
type of marginal cost that should be taken into consideration15. As noted by Dreze (1995)
" Vickrey advocates prices reecting continuously (in time)16 short run marginal social cost
while Masse advocates prices reecting long run marginal cost". The following citation from
Boiteux (1949)(1951) illustrates at best the French perspective : "La theorie de la vente au
cou^t marginal para^t susceptible de nombreuses interpretations. Vendre au cou^t marginal,
c'est xer un prix egal au cou^t de production d'une unite supplementaire. Ce cou^t diere
evidemment suivant que l'on envisage de produire une seule fois cette unite supplementaire,
ou au contraire d'augmenter dorenavant d'une unite le ux de biens que l'on produisait
jusqu'alors : la production a titre exceptionnel d'une unite supplementaire isolee ne saurait
justier une modication des equipements; l'accroissement denitif du ux de production en
revanche pourra s'accompagner d'une readaptation des equipements au nouveau niveau de
15Concerning peak load pricing, Joskow (1976) makes a distinction between the American, French and
British approaches. Berg and Tschirhart (1995) point ou that marginal-cost pricing can be found incognito
in the 1978 Public Utility Regulation Policy Act (PURPA) and that PURPA promoted six pricing standards
in the name of eciency and conservation.
16This is often refered to as spot pricing or responsive pricing (See e.g. Vickrey (1971)).
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production.
La notion de tarif implique l'idee de ux. On n'etablit pas une tarication pour etablir
un stock accidentellement disponible, mais pour obtenir un equilibre durable entre le ux de
la demande et le ux de la production........
C'est la tout au moins une conception du prix marginal. A l'oppose, on y trouve celle
que revele l'apologue du voyageur supplementaire : un train va partir; il y reste une place
vide; un voyageur se presente qui est dispose a l'occuper s'il ne doit pas payer trop cher.
Le cou^t du transport de ce voyageur supplementaire ne porte que sur les quelques grammes
de charbon necessites par la traction de son poids et sur les molecules de moleskine qu'il
arrachera a la banquette pendant la duree du voyage........."
The disagreement between the two approaches concerns the extent to which the prices of
these commodities should be adjusted continuously in response to foreseeable uctuations in
either supply or demand. According to Dreze (1995) : "The alternatives are relatively stable
prices leading to inecient use and occasional quantity rationning, or unpredictable price
variations, which entail costs to users like monitoring prices and adjusting quantities"17.
Quite interestingly, the practices have evolved since the early implementations of these ideas
in the fthies. The green tari has been followed at EDF by major innovations in the eighties
and nineties originating from the diculty of forecasting peak loads far ahead and implying
the desirability of adjusting tarifs at short notice. We will come back on these pricing
innovations and others in the second part of the paper.
3 The Successors
The precursors have been mostly interested in deriving operational implications of marginal
cost pricing. One important exception is of course Boiteux's seminal paper (1956) in which
he derives optimal pricing of a public monopoly subject to a public constraint.
We have concluded the previous subsection by reporting some of the the criticisms that
were formulated by eminent U.S. economists against marginal cost pricing. The necessity of
raising public funds to nance the decit resulting from the application of this pricing policy
is among the most important arguments supporting these dissent views. This theme is also
a major concern in Kolm's work on public pricing. In Kolm (1971c), he oers a very nice
analysis of the multiplicity of roles played by prices and of the potential conicts between
17Marschak(1960) also provides an interesting analysis of this controversy. After presenting what was
considered as an ideal rule by the French engineers, he writes "The view that the social cost of instability
exceeds the social cost of such temporarily non-marginal pricing seems to be accepted in formulating actual
pricing reforms. The prices initially approximated are those appropriate in long-run equilibrium".
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these roles. Under the heading "Les Fonctions Sociales des prix Publics", he develops a
very stimulating and modern analysis of the use of these prices as policy instruments18. He
writes19 " Un tarif a une double incidence directe sur les usagers et sur le budget du service,
qui creent elles-me^mes des incidences directes multiples; on peut respectivement les appeler
incidence aval et incidence amont ou "eet de prix" et "eet de budget". Par son eet sur
les usagers, le tarif inuence leur consommation de ce service, leurs consommations de biens
et services complementaires et substituts par eet de substitution, toutes les consommations
et productions de ces personnes par eet de revenu; par l'intermediare de ces reactions, il
inuence aussi les productions de biens et services complementaires et concurrents.....; tous
ces eets a leur tour, inuencent le degre de realisation des objectifs sociaux. Par ailleurs, le
tarif inuence le solde budgetaire du service. ce solde agit a son tour sur les budgets publics
et a par la trois types d'eets : (1) il inuence les autres recettes et depenses publiques, et
en particulier les impo^ts et les autres services publics, (2) il agit ainsi sur les fonctions des
nances publiques, allocation publique, distribution des revenus et eets macroeconomiques,
et d'autre part (3) il inuence le degre d'autonomie des divers elements de la hierarchie
politique et administrative et par la l'ecacite de cette organisation". The rst incidence
i.e. the role of prices as signals of social costs ( in the French language, this is referred to as "la
verite des prix") has been the main focus of the advocates of marginal cost pricing. While not
ignored, the second incidence was considered less important. Instead, in all his contributions,
Kolm always derives the budgetary implications of marginal cost pricing. In Kolm (1971c),
he writes20 "Voici donc pose le dilemme fondamental de la tarication publique : un prix
a plusieurs fonctions sociales qu'une certaine structure technique de la production rend
incompatibles en ce sens que le meilleur niveau pour l'une est mauvais pour l'autre. Ainsi
s'opposent les ro^les du prix comme outil d'information et de coordination sur les marches et
comme source de revenu, en bref ses fonctions marchandes et nancieres, ou, pourrait-on dire,
ses ecacites interne et externe". Kolm (1971a) writes21 : " La seconde fonction provient
de ce que l'equilibre budgetaire est une condition necessaire d'autonomie complete.......Or
l'autonomie fait que des decisions de production et de gestion du service sont prises par
des personnes qui connaissent mieux sa fonction de production et les caracteristiques des
demandes des usagers. Son avantage est donc encore, de decentralisation des decisions,
mais au lieu que ce soit entre le service et les usagers, cest maintenant entre le service et
une autorite qui le superviserait. On peut appeler la premiere la decentralisation aval des
18This issue was explored early in Kolm (1968a).
19On pages 31-32.
20On page 11.
21On pages 96-97.
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decisions et la seconde la decentralisation amont des decisions, la reference etant maintenant
le service". Kolm (1971c) writes22 "Par rapport a un etat ou l'equilibre budgetaire est exige,
d'une part l'assurance que le decit sera comble par un budget public o^te a la direction de
l'entreprise l'incitation directe a satisfaire le public au mieux et au moindre cou^t, d'autre part
l'autorite publique qui gere ce budget doit contro^ler la gestion du service, ce qui cause des
cou^ts d'administration et surtout empe^che que des decisions soient prises par les personnes
les mieux informees et rapidement".
Kolm (1971b) points out the internal contradictions of the structure of prices. He
writes23 "La regle de vente au cou^t marginal a pour but de promouvoir la decentralisation
des decisions par le systeme de prix. d'autre part, l'equilibre budgetaire d'une entreprise
a pour principal intere^t d'assurer son independance : c'est donc aussi un instrument de
decentralisation des decisions. Or, quand a la fois la production est a rendement croissant et
le produit doit e^tre vendu a un prix uniforme, la vente au cou^t marginal entra^ne le decit.
Il y a donc contradiction entre ces deux outils de decentralisation des decisions.
To understand why the existence of a decit is perceived by Kolm and others as socially
costly, it is important to remind that the virtues of marginal cost pricing relie upon a set of
assumptions dening what is is traditionally described as a rst best economic environment.
The systematic exploration of the optimal departures from marginal cost pricing (and other
rst best alocation or pricing rules) resulting from the consideration of second best economic
environements has been one of the major area of research in theoretical public economics
since the seventies24. The new generation of French engineer-economists25, following Kolm
and the precursors, has made seminal contributions to these topics ranging from second-best
22On pages10-11.
23On pages 399-400.
24Guesnerie (1995) considers second-best modelling as one important development of modern public eco-
nomics. He notes however that "the eects of the innovation have been slow. The earlier neoclassical
tradition, a branch of which has culminated in the development of the so-called arrow debreu model, had
generated a coherent body of knowledge which was and remain extremely inuential among economists. The
ideas, models and intuitions propagated by such a tradition have deeply impregnated the profession and can
still be viewed as one of its dominant theoretical "cultures".
25This new generation has contributed to most of the topics of modern economics. In this group, Gues-
nerie's research agenda on general second-best environments one one hand and Laont's works on the eco-
nomics of regulation on the other hand are, in many respects, the closest to the work of the precursors
including Kolm.
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modeling26 to the economics of regulation27. Even, if that was not the main concern of
the precursors, we must of course mention the pioneering contribution of Boiteux (1956)
where he derives, independently of Ramsey (1927), the optimal pricing rules of a public
utility subject to a budget constraint. Kolm (1971b,d) has developped a general theory of
optimal pricing when some economic agents are subject to some second best constraints that
he calls value constraints; these constraints are either constraints on prices or on budgets
(like in Boiteux). Besides the fact that Boiteux's rule appears as a corollary of his general
result, it should be noted that his general theory allows a careful analysis of many other
questions. He oers a very innovative exploration of the consequences of imposing balance
of payment restrictions on international economic policies. He also provides a set of general
results on optimal local departures from marginal cost prices where local means that we
are in some neighborhood of the rst best allocation. In such case, the social deadweight
loss is a negative denite quadratic form with respect to distorsions, and optimal distorsions
are quite easy to derive. Kolm obtains28 results on optimal distorsions in the case where
26In his presidential address to the European economic association, Guesnerie (1995) writes "Second-best
studies have challenged a number of ideas and intuitions of the so-called rst best culture. But the body
of knowledge which they have generated does not have the coherency, the appeal orthe clarity that would
allow to build a genuine second-best culture. Consolidating a second-best body of knowledge that would truly
encompass the rst-best conceptions, integrating it better within the mainstream culture of the profession is
in my opinion a desirable aim and constitutes one of the current challenges to public economics.....The starting
point is here an education exposed, through the direct or indirect inuence of allais, Boiteux, Malinvaud,
Kolm..to the teachings of the French school of "ingenieurs economistes" which promoted a variant of the
rst-best tradition".
27Laont and Tirole writes "Academics have traditionally emphasized institutional and empirical research
on regulatory issues, butthere is also a substantial and useful heritage in the area. By and large, the most
successful contributions refers to the normative aspects of natural monopoly pricing..... Despite some head-
way on the pricing front the traditional theoretical approach has stalled precisely where the new regulatory
economics has sprung : the incentive front. To be certain, received theory implicitely touches on incentive
issues : the Ramsey-Boiteux model rulesout government transfers precisely eacause they might be abused,
and the Averch-Johnson model describes a regulated rm's self-interested input choices. But received theory
can only go so far. A more rigorous and realistic approach must adhere to the discipline of the broader
principal-agent theory. Modeling must include a full decription of the rm's and the regulators's objectives,
information structures, instruments, and constraints. Information structures and the set of feasible regula-
tory schemes must as much as possible reects real-world observationaland contractual costs... From this
perspective there are three reasons why regulation is not a simple exercice in second-best optimization theory :
asymmetric information, lack of commitment, and imperfect regulators. Asymmetric information limits the
control the regulator can exert over the rm. The diculty for the regulator to commit to incentive schemes,
for contractual or legal reasons, also reduces the eciency of regulation. last the regulators or politicians
may be incompetent, have their own hidden agenda, or simply becaptured by interest groups; they may then
not optimize social welfare. Only a thorough investigation of these limits to perfect regulation can shed light
on many issues of the traditional agenda of regulatory economics".
28These results also appear in Kolm (1969a). Kolm (1968b) is a very useful application of these principle
to an environment where two transportation alternatives (say road and metro), both subject congestion, are
in competition. Given that the unit price of road services departs from its marginal social cost, what should
be the optimal pricing of a metro ticket ?
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endogenous distorsions correct exogenous ones and in the case where the role of distorsions
is to raise an exogenous budget.
We are not going to review here the diversity of situations and constraints leading to
second-best environments and oering some rationale to depart from marginal cost pricing.
According to Guesnerie (1975b) " Second best problems arise when the actual realization
of rst best optima through competitive markets, as indicated by the main theorem of
welfare economics, becomes impossible. One can distinguish for the sake of simplicity three
dierent types of reasons preventing the decentralized attainment of Pareto optima through
a competitive procedure.
(1) Certain markets cannot be organized (forward markets, risk markets,...) whereas
others cannot be cleared (keynesian underemployment,...)
(2) Lump-sum transfers postulated by the traditional welfare theory cannot be imple-
mented in the real world.
(3) Even if all markets do exist and if any lump sum transfer is feasible, certain agents
may have a noncompetitive behavior".
The second reason is often listed as the main argument to explain why public funds are
costly. If the public budgets cannot be raised through that neutral tool, then it must be the
case that some "imperfect" taxation devices are used to do so. Among these instruments
appear primarily consumption taxes : the vector of taxes is dened as the dierence betwen
the vector of consumption prices and the vector of production prices. The interested reader
will nd in Guesnerie (1995b) a complete analysis of several important extensions of the
basic Walrasian model of general equilibrium where these new instruments are introduced
together with the other variables and constraints describing the public sector (production
of public or private goods, pricing of public utilities, quantity controls,....) that could be
considered. It should be clear that the derivation of the optimal public policy cannot avoid
a complete preliminary analysis of the structure of the set of tax equilibria. This is not
an easy task and the set of equilibria displays some unusual features leading to dierent
sorts of nonconvexities which make the analysis more complicated and optimizing over that
set of equilibria calls for prudence. Social optimization provides a set of shadow prices for
each commodity ( the Lagrange multipliers attached to the scarcity constraints). These
shadow prices give the right social valuations of an exogenous manna of extra endowments.
Contrary to rst-best optimization, these social opportunity costs do no coincide any longer,
in general, with market prices. The extent of the discrepancy between prices and values will
vary across problems29. In many problems, like for instance the production of pure public
29Dreze and Stern (1990) is also an excellent reference on this topic.
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goods30 or private goods by the public sector, the vector of shadow prices coincide with
the vector of production prices. In some other problems, like for instance the production
of private goods by the public sector when the supply behavior of the private sector is
noncompetitive, but lump sum transfers are feasible, the vector of shadow prices coincides
with the vector of consumption prices. In some other problems, like the one considered by
Boiteux (a public rm subject to a budgetary constraint) where lump sum transfers are
also feasible, the derivation of the shadow prices show that the vector of Boiteux prices is a
convex combination of the vectors of market and shadow prices.
The implications of these considerations for the marginal cost doctrine are quite impor-
tant. As pointed out by Guesnerie (1980) "In a rst-best world, pricing policies obey a
simple principle : the price of the marginal unit sold to each consumer should equate its
marginal cost. even if the implementation of such a rule may raise further problems, it is of
universal theoretical validity.
In a second best world where the absence of markets or behavioral constraints prevent
the attainement of rst-best Pareto optima, the prescriptions for optimal pricing policie
lose both simplicity and universality. Simplicity, because prices should no longer equate
marginal costs, even if marginal costs wre computed on the social value of commodities
rather than production prices, but should take into account other elements such as demand
eleasticities. Universality, because the diculty of designing piecemeal policies dening
rules valid for one sector independently of government action in other sectors has been
constantly emphasized by second-best theory. In particular, the pricing rules which are
established from one theoretical model do depend in some sense on the whole set of policy
and behavioral assumptions made in the model. Changing the policy tools available to the
government not only changes the optimal prices which would emerge but also possibly the
qualitative features of the optimal pricing rule and the type of information required for its
implementation. It is then quite important for policy purposes to understand the logic of the
derivation of pricing rules in order to evaluate their sensitivity to modications of policy and
behavioral assumptions". This strongly suggest that we should investigate the the principles
governing the derivation of second-best pricing rules in a general equilibrium setting instead
of a sequential examination of the recommendations attached to any particular environment.
For instance, if we think that marginal cost pricing should be adandoned because it leads
to a decit, the exploration of the new pricing rules should not eclude (unless explained
otherwise) additional instruments that would allow to relax the constraints. For instance
in a problem a la Boiteux, given the existence of an "exogenous" distorsion, it makes sense
30Guesnerie derives a modied Samuelson 's rule.
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to use "endogenous distorsions" like consumption taxes or quantity controls31. The shadow
cost of the budgetary constraint will depend upon the spectrum of instruments and we
should further anticipate that besides their allocational role, pricing policies will also play
a distributional role.
It was implicit in our discussion of these issues that any normative or positive exploration
of the optimal pricing policies must be conducted in a general equilibrium framework with
the goal of obtaining an accurate theoretical understanding of the economic interdependen-
cies which should be taken into consideration in the design of these policies. Too often, these
interdependencies and the diculties resulting from this approach are partly ignored by
partial equilibrium derivations based on more or less sophisticated versions of the consumer
surplus. This is far from being a secundary issue as demonstrated by Guesnerie (1975a). As
already discussed, the rationale for the control by the public sector of some specic rms or
industries arise from the non-convexity of production sets in a situation with high xed costs
and increasing returns to scale. As noted by Dreze (1995) " The presumption in this setting
was that marginal cost pricing with decits nanced by lump-sum taxes would sustain a
rst-best ecient, if such an allocation were feasible at all. In other words, the presumption
was that an analogue of the rst welfare theorem holds for marginal cost pricing equilib-
ria". Guesnerie has demonstrated32 that this presumption fails as a general proposition.
The existence of Pareto improving income redistributions challenges the classical view on
separation of eciency and equity33. The analysis of the set of Pareto optima in second-best
environments reveals that this phenomenon is also present there.
31In second-best environments, quantity rationing, in kind transfers and all sorts of instruments disqualied
by the rst best culture turn out to be very valuable, as demonstrated for instance by Guesnerie and Roberts
(1987) and Wijkander (1988).
32Beato and Mas-Colell (1985) have produced an example where even aggregate productive eciency is
violated. Guesnerie's seminal paper has impulsed a vast literature including among others Bonnisseau and
Cornet (), Brown and Heal (1979) and Vohra (1992). The reader may refer to the special issue of the
Journal of Mathematical Economucs devoted to these questions (Cornet (1988)). The theory of general
equilibrium has also been extended to cover other "correct" rules of management which dier from marginal
cost pricing (Ramsey-Boiteux, two-part taris,....). The conlusions reached by these papers concerning the
welfare properties of these equilibria are also negative (see e.g. Brown and Heal (1980), Dierker (1991)).
Brown and Heal (1983) oers a nice discussion of some of these issues in a simplied general equilibrium
framework.
33This view has been expressed by many authors. Brown and Heal write "In the Arrow-Debreu model,
equity and eciency are independent dimensions, and much of our accepted welfare economics and cost-
benet analysis rests, explicitely or implicitely, on this fact. The examples we present demonstrate that,
once we admit increasing returns, the situation is fundamentally dierent. Because, some are ecient and
others inecient, one can no longer judge between alternative distributions purely in terms of equity. It
is necessary to consider both the equity and eciency dimensions simultaneously" while Blackorby (1990)
claims that "..if second-best considerations are taken seriously, then it is much more dicult, if not impossible,
to divorce eciency from equity than one might have thought from the use of rst-best economic models".
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While devoting some special attention to the problems raised by the decit34, Kolm dis-
cusses extensively all the other implications of acting in a second best environment. He
points out in many occasions the distributional role of public prices. Kolm (1971c) writes35
"Enn, les tarifs des services publics peuvent e^tre utilises a n de redistribution du revenu ef-
fectif, et donc du bien e^tre, dans la societe, par exemple en demandant moins cher a certaines
categories d'usagers que l'on veut favoriser. L'economiste normatif traditionnel s'oppose a
cette action : il vaudrait mieux, dit-il eectuer cette redistribution par des transferts directs
et laisser les beneciaires depenser cet argent comme ils le preferent pluto^t que de subven-
tionner leur consommation du service en question. cette argumentation est tres judicieuse.
Mais qu'en reste t-il si, en fait, ces transferts ne sont pas eectues. Rien ne justie, alors, de
ne pas utiliser le tarif a n de redistribution...". He was clearly considerering as a postulate
that lump sum transfers simply do not exist. For instance, in (1971c) he writes36 "mais
l'argument presente contre l'emploi des prix a n de justice distributive presente un defaut
plus grave. c'est que les transferts forfaitaires et impo^ts de capitation proposes comme al-
ternative simplement n'existent pas et ne peuvent exister. en eet, ces operations doivent
avoir une assiete composee de critees objectifs. Or les proprietes qui denissent ces derniers
peuvent en general e^tre modiees, avec plus ou moins de facilite par les personnes con-
cernees". Besides equity and justice considerations, he explores in great details in chapter 3
of Kolm (1971c) the dierent costs of taris and public funds including the macroeconomic
costs which would appear if the analysis was conducted in a non Walrasian framework where
markets do not necessarily clear through prices.
Before moving to the next and last part of our description of the inuence of Kolm on his
successors, we would like to point that while we have limited most of the above discussion
to linear prices, Kolm has also investigated more sophisticated pricing rules involving non
linerarities. Kolm (1969b) contains very important developments on the possibilities opened
by general taris37. In this monograph, he derives indeed many interesting results on the
34The publication in France in 1967 of the "Rapport du Comite Interministeriel des Enreprises Publiques"
called "Rapport Nora" pointing out the importance of the decits of the main French nationalized rms has
originated a lot of controversy between economists.
35On page 13.
36On pages 73-74. On page 399, in Kolm (1971b), he also claims that " Quand les transferts interindividuels
sans restriction des theoriciens n'existent pas, les prix ont un ro^le de distribution du revenu. Dans le monde
reel, la repartition des impo^ts, qui est l'instrument de ces transferts (avec quelques subventions) est limitee
et les prix restent la principale voie de distribution du revenu.....".
37Interestingly, in many occasions (for instance in Kolm (1971c) on pages 12-14), he calls the attention on
the fact that rst order optimality demands that the marginal price and the marginal cost are equal, but not
that the marginal price be constant : he calls "inframarginales" the units preceding the marginal one. These
units could be sold at a dierent price. He immediately infers from this observation that adequately chosen
non linear taris could reconcile optimality and budget balance. But he also recognizes, almost immediately
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properties of optimal (with respect to some social objectives) non linear taris under various
sets of constraints. It contains a presentation of the general mechanism design problem
where the diculties raised by the fact that the preferences of the customers are privately
known are rst isolated before being taken into consideration in the last two chapters of the
book. In reference to the benchmark case where informational matters are ignored (that
he calls "l'optimum"), he writes38 "Il ne tient souvent pas compte explicitement du fait
que le tarif doive en general e^tre le me^me pour de nombreux usagers". Under the heading
"La communaute", he provides a very stimulating presentation of the constraints attached
to these observability issues39 and derives the properties of the the optimal solution when
these constraints are incorporated : the formula in the middle of page 95, characterizing
the optimal gap between the marginal tari and the marginal cost is nothing less than the
formula found in any modern textbook on optimal regulation of monopolies40. Under the
heading "discrimination", he refers to the various forms of taris that are met with a special
attention to the case of two-part taris ( he uses the word "forfait" to dened the xed part
of the payment) but more importantly to the determination of a partition of the population
into groups where a specic tari is attached to each group41. Specically, he decomposes
the general problem into three nested problems :
(1) Le "Probleme de Complexite " : how many groups ?
(2) Le "Probleme d' Aectation" : how customers are assigned to the groups42 ?
after these good news, that the implementation of the taris may raise new costs. We reach the limit of
the marginal analysis as for instance in the case of two-part taris the computation of the forfait requires
information on the preferences of the customers beyong the marginal valuation (he calls it "valeur d'usage").
There is then a risk of suboptimal exclusion that he calls "risque d'exclusion intempestive". The possibility
of dierential pricing is a point which is also raised by some of the opponents to marginal cost pricing.
The lack of consideration for this exibility is listed among the eight "inmities" of marginal cost pricing
considered by Clemens (1963). He writes: "In my mind, the EDF is the victim of the same fallacy that
characterizes Hotelling's thesis; namely, the failure to allow for dierential pricing. Optimization of social
welfare does not require that all output be priced at marginal cost; all that is required is that the marginal
unit be priced at marginal cost. This requirement may be met satisfactorily and without government subsidy
by a well designed rate system".
38On page 14. On page 48, he also writes "Mais toute cette analyse suppose que cahque usager peut e^tre
soumis individuellemnt a un tarif propre, et elle ne tient pas compte explicitement des cou^ts de tarication
et de l'absence de connaissance parfaite".
39On pages 84-87.
40His computation, on page 98, of what he calls the "forfait optimal" follows from what he has introduced
under the name "droit d'abstention" which is strictly analogous to what is refered todays as the participation
constraint.
41On page 114, he writes "La discrimination du tarif peut e^tre entre les usagers, entre les eventualites,
entre les variations de chaque parametre et en particulier entre les unites de chaque quantite ou les varietes
de chaque quantite".
42His discussion on pages 118-122 of the criteria to assign customers to groups is very insighful even if
not formulated with the modern terminology of the theory of incentives. His distinction between "critere
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(3) Le "probleme de Communaute" : How optimal taris in each group are determined
?
His work contains a lot of important insights and uses advanced and sophisticated tech-
niques. For instance, he determines the qualitative features of the optimal tari when the
number of prices is xed to an exogenous nite number (this constraint being justied by
cost of taris considerations). He provides a detailed study of the multiproduct case with
the incorporation of constraints on prices reecting the existence of secondary markets43.
We were particularly strongly impressed by his treatment of the assignment problem as an
linear program with integer constraints. It is interesting to point out that in this monograph
(in contrast, to the books discussed in the preceding paragraphs), the cost of public fund
is introduced in a reduced form through a single parameter 1 + , a practice completely
adopted by most of the contemporary authors in the economics of regulation.
We now arrive to the last part of the st section of this paper describing the anticipations
of Kolm's contributions on the contemporary economics of regulation. We have previously
introduced his distinction between the "incidence aval" and the "incidence amont" of the
budget and have focused until now on the "incidence aval". Chapter 4 in Kolm (1971c) is,
in my opinion, an extremely important and early contribution to the theory of organizations
and the analysis of agency costs that arise as soon as several economic agents with conict-
ual interests interact through complicated (contractual) relationships. The lack of autonomy
resulting from a budget decit or the authority of a supervisor on prices, outputs, investm-
ments and other dimensions of the rm or administration are central to the exploration of
what he has referred to as the "incidence amont". He writes44 "Si le service a un decit,
celui-ci doit e^tre comble par un budget public. Les autorites politiques et administratives
qui choisissent ce dernier doivent connaitre l'usage, estimer l'utilite, decider des montants et
verier l'emploi de ces fonds, et, au besoin, elles doivent pouvoir imposer la conformite de la
loi budgetaire. Elles doivent donc exercer un contro^le de disposer d'un droit de commande
sur le service (ce peut e^tre la menace de ne pas renouveller ou de diminuer la subvention au
prochain exercice. Il en resulte par rapport a un etat d'equilibre budgetaire :
(1) des cou^ts d'administration pour ces decisions et contro^les nanciers et techniques
(2) une perte d'information due au fait que des decisions sont prises par l'autorite ad-
fondamental" and "critere de reconnaissance" is very useful. He writes "La recherche d'un critere objectif
bien correle a la disposition a payer est un vieux probleme des monopoles prives. Dupuit (pour le monopole
public) suggere que les passagers sur son pont soient tarifes selon leur couvre-chef : a me^me intensite de
besoin les bourgeois a chapeau acceptent un prix plus eleve que les ouvriers a casquette".
43His constraints can also be reinterpreted as no cross-subsidization constraints. A contemporary analysis
of the set of prices meeting these conditions appears in Faulhaber (1975).
44On pages 79-80.
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ministrative et politique au lieu de l'e^tre par le service qui connait generalement mieux les
possibilites techniques et les besoins des usagers
(3) un gain possible de specialisation et d'economie d'echelle du^ a la realisation de cer-
taines taches de prelevement nancier, de choix budgetaire et de comptabilite par une ad-
ministration centrale ou specialisee pluto^t que par le service
(4) un gain de conformite du service aux choix de la societe esprimes par la voie politique
(5) un gain possible de coordination avec les situations et choix des autres services publics
(6) un changement de comportement des dirigeants du service par diminution de leur
domaine de choix
(7) un changement de comportement des dirigeants du service par modication de leurs
incitations, et en particulier par perte de l'incitation directe a maximiser le surplus budgetaire
puisque, quelque negatif qu'il soit, ce decit est couvert par le budget public."
While not formulated with the modern terminology, this statement of this problem echoes
in many respects what is now referred to as a mechanism design issue45. He sketches the
various benets, costs and constraints involved in the hierarchical relationship between the
central political and administrative authorities and the manager(s) of the service. The
chapter is devoted to an analysis of these various issues attached to the problem and also
contains some mathematical preliminary analysis of some of those. We are not going to
review the totality of this rich material but oer instead a brief selective inspection of few
key ideas and insights that were well ahead of his time and will receive a general formulation
explained at the end of this section.
Interestingly, Kolm operates a distinction between the costs of communication/organization
and the costs of incentives. He analyses the rst dimension by introducing a graph theo-
retical formulation where the vertices and the edges represent respectively the members of
the service and the channels of communication between them : he characterizes the graphs
which minimize a cost which adds the cost of channels and the cost of messages. He then
proceeds to an analysis of the costs of incentives which is somehow premonitory. He writes46
: "Transferts d'information et organisation du travail et du pouvoir selon les connaissances
repondent au probleme du savoir des membres. reste celui du vouloir : il ne sut pas qu'ils
45He oers a very stimulating discussion of the notions of centralization and decentralization while regret-
ting that they are usually not dened with enough accuracy. On page 82, he writes : "Pour dresser le bilan
social du tarif il faut estimer les gains et les pertes de cette autonomie. Malheureusement, nous ne pouvons
pas pour cela nous appuyer sur une theorie elaboree et bien connue comme nous avons pu le faire pour les
mecanismes de marche car il n'existe rien de tel pour les organisations administratives. Nous devons donc
ici forger nos outils. ceci a l'alure d'une digression mais est necessaire pour donner une base solide a l'etude
de rentabilite du degre de centralisation ou decentralisation".
46On page 89-90.
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sachent bien agir sachent bien agir, encore faut-il qu'ils le veuillent. Pour realiser sa raison
d'e^tre, une administration est mue par des membres dont les raisons d'agir peuvent e^tre fort
dierentes du seul but de remplir cette fonction sociale. Faire que malgre cela leurs choix ser-
vent au mieux cette n est le probleme d'incitation. L'incitation a deux facteurs et l'incitation
publique deux objectifs. Les premiers sont les motivations des personnes et les conditions
dans lesquelles elles decident. Les seconds sont l'ecacite productive et le meilleur service du
public d'une part et la conformite administrative et politique de l'autre". After discussing in
turn the meaning of these notions, he aims to compare the respective performances of three
dierent organizational modes that he calls Gestion Commerciale, Gestion Autonome and
Gestion Administrative Integree". We are not going to dene precisely all of them. The rst
one corresponds to pure delegation to the private sector while the last one would correspond
to an organization receiving all its instructions from some central administrative/political
authority. The second one is somewhere in between. In his comparative analysis, he clearly
identies the trade-o which is a cornerstone of the modern approach : the organizations
which perform well in terms of cost optimization and quality of service perform more poorly
in terms of conformity to the objectives of the society. For instance, in his examination
of the third organization, after arguing that it was " a priori la meilleure lorsque l'utilite
du service rendu est revelee par la voie politique", he also asserts47 "Par contre, l'ecacite
productive du service et la satisfaction de ces usagers demandent la meilleure connaissance
possible a la fois de sa fonction de production et des caracteristiques de la demande. Or les
membres du service ont en general sur ce plan un avantage parfois considerable, sur ceux
des administrations plus centrales. Les interferences directes de celles-ci risquent donc d'e^tre
nefastes de ce point de vue. Mais le service n'utilise convenablement sa connaissance que s'il
y est incite. Bien qu'ignorant les actes precis les meilleurs, l'autorite dispose souvent d'un
excellent moyen de realiser cette incitation : c'est de vendre le produit et de choisir le prot
comme indicateur de succes au niveau duquel attacher sanctions et recompenses. Il sut en
particulier que ces dernieres soient tout simplement des remunerations personnelles fonctions
croissantes de ce benece, ce qui nous ramene a une gestion commerciale ou, eventuellement
autonome". The third appendix of his chapter is devoted to an analytical formulation of this
tradeo where the cost of public funds 1+ stands for the agency cost while the ineciency
costs48 resulting from poor incentives are themselves captured by a single number which only
appears in the case where the organization is fully integrated. While insighful, this reduced
47On page 100.
48We refer te reader to the textbook of Stiglitz (1988) on pages194-210 for a stimulating presentation of
the arguments and evidence concerning the comparison of eciency in the public and private sectors as well
as an anlysis of the bureaucracy.
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form did not provide a complete understanding of the channels through which the incentives
operate. This has been done in modern times by the new economics of regulation which was
itself constructed on the solid bases established in the eighties by the theory of incentives
and the economics of information.
In presenting the contributions of the French precursors of Kolm to the derivation of
the optimal rules of management ofpublic monopolies, we have insisted on the historical
context. To some extent, the new economics of regulation is also the product of two forces : a
specic social and economic demand arising in many countries together with some important
developments in economic theory. During the eigthies, we observed a renewed interest in the
regulation of natural monopolies and oligopolies49. As noted by Laont and Tirole (1993) :
"In the policy arena discontent was expresses with the price, quality, and cost performance of
regulated rms and goverment contractors. The remedies sought in specic industries diered
remarkably : more powerful incentive schemes were proposed and implemented, deregulation
was encouraged to free up competition and entry, and in some countries changes in ownership
(privatization) occured".
While dierent in terms of policy motivations and theoretical emphasis, the modern
theory of regulation50 is to a large extent in the continuation of the practical and theoretical
construction of the predecessors. Among other things, the lack of focus on incentives issues
by regulatory theory was perceived as a serious limitation. As noted by Laont and Tirole
(1993) : "The academic debate attempted to shed light on some shortcomings of the generally
accepted theory of regulation. Regulatory theory largely ignored incentive issues. Because
exogenous constraints rather than the limited access to information of regulators were the
source of inecient regulatory outcomes, the theory of regulation did not meet the standards
of the newly developed principal agent theory whose aim is to highlight the information
limitations that impair agency relationships. Furthermore, the considerably simplied formal
models that assumed away imperfect information were less realistic in that they implied
policy recommendations that require information not available to regulators in practice51".
49See Spulber (1989).
50It should be pointed out that this theory mostly uses the partial equilibrium framework.
51We will not examine the "sociology" of these regulatory agencies. The French engineers economists listed
above as the precursors, were acting inside the rms on behalf of the general interest . Further regulation was
not needed. Some of the pioneers have expressed their skepticism about the social benets to be expected
from the new regulation. Concerning electricity, Boiteux (2007) writes "la mission qu'avait recue EDF
etait, d'une part de produire au cou^t minimum et, d'autre part, de vendre au prix de revient (marginal de
long terme au sens des experts) sans chercher a proter de son monopole pour ranconner la clientele. Ce
comportement vertueux, qui suscite aujourd'hui l'incredulite, n'apparaissait pas invraisemblable du temps
des trente glorieuses et de ce que l'on appelait encoreles grands commis de l'etat". With nostalgy and irony,
he also alludes to the "disparition" in the political economy approach of the actors dened in the traditional
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The contemporary theory analyses regulation, in particular the regulation of natural mo-
nopolies, as the strategic outcome of an agency relationship. Any description of this sequen-
tial strategic interaction calls for a very careful examination of the regulatory environment
which must be consistent with the rms's and regulators' information structures, constraints
and feasible instruments. Constraints are often classied into three types : informational,
transactional, and administrative and political. Of course, these constraints limit the e-
ciency of the control of government agencies and prevent the regulator from implementing
his prefered policy (whatever it may be)52. The nature of the regulatory instruments and
incentive schemes that could be used by the regulator can also vary across problems. they
typically use accounting and demand data to monitor a rm's performance. Accounting data
are mainly the rm's aggregate cost or prot which the demand data on which contracts
can most easily be based are prices and quantities. It is then important to know the scope
of possibilities opened to the regulator. According to Laont and Tirole, current incentive
schemes can be analysed along two dividing lines. The rst is whether the governmemnt is
allowed to subsidize (or tax) regulated rms, that is , whether regulated rms can receive
public funds and thus to cover all their costs through direct charges to private customers.
the second is the power of the incentive schemes, that is the link between the rm's transfer
from the government and/or the rm's prices and its cost or prot performance.
Laont and Tirole (1993) oers a nice classication53 of the more important existing
regulatory schemes (including cost-plus contracts,price caps and cost of service regulation)
along these two dimensions. They also revisit the received theory in particular marginal cost
pricing and the criticisms formulated against its use by Coase and others (to which we have
already alluded) and Boiteux-Ramsey pricing. Interestingly, they operate a clever distinction
normative approach of our textbooks as the benevolent social planners corresponding here to the managers
of the rms, assumed indeed to be obedient civil servants instructed to follow marginal cost pricing rules. "A
force d'enseigner aux jeunes generations que l'intere^t general, c'est l'intere^t de la classe au pouvoir (et non
l'intere^t collectif tel que le concoit la classe au puvoir), a force d'expliquer que toute personne qui detient un
pouvoir ne renoncera a en user pour s'enrichir que dans la stricte mesure ou on l'y obligera ecacement (au
lieu d'admettre qu'il en usera d'abord pour mener la mission qui lui a ete conee)....., a force de tout cela,
l'entreprise nationalisee a du plomb dans l'aile. Car dans un tel contexte, pourquoi le patron d'une EDF
qui serait restee en monopole nationalise se decarcasserait-il encore a comprimer ses prix de revient s'il n'en
tire aucun prot ?....... Si le genre de personnage qui ne se laisserait pas aller a de telles facilites n'existe
plus, il faut en eet tirer les consequences. EDF, privatisee doit e^tre laissee libre de gagner durablement le
maximum d'argent, dans les limites de la legalite et des contraintes que va lui imposer un "regulateur". Mais
ce regulateur, ou bien il est competent et desintesse, et il subsisterait donc un personnage apte a assumer
a sa te^te la destinee d'une EDF encore nationalisee; ou bien il est incompetent et/ou interesse, et cela va
poser quelques problemes."
52See Laont and Tirole (1993) for a more detailed exposition of the limits to eciency resulting from
these constraints.
53See table 1 on page 11.
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between three criticisms, which are (as argued previously) also formulated by Kolm : the
implications of a decit, the limits of the marginal analysis and the inappropriate incentives
for cost reduction54. We now focus on this last point, referred to as incidence amont in
Kolm's terminology as it is a key concern of the agenda of the new regulatory economics and
will allow us to show how the Kolm's intuitions have been explored and formulated within
this new framework.
To do so, we have to depart from the assumption of an exogenous cost function as dened
in (1) and consider the following one which represents the controlled experiment of Laont
and Tirole (1993).
C = C(; e; q1; q2; ::::; qK) + "
where as before q = (q1; q2; ::::; qK) 2 <K+ denotes the vector of outputs of the rm, 
is a technological parameter, e is the eort or cost-reducing activity and " is a noise term
standing for either forecast errors or accounting inaccuracies. Letting t denote the monetary
transfer from the regulator to the rm and  (e) the disutility of eort, the rm's objective
function is assumed to be :
U  t   (e)
On the other hand, we denote by V (q) the social value associated with the production q
(for instance, in the case of private goods, V (q) is often assumed to be the sum of the net
consumer surplus S(q)   R(q) (with S(q) being the gross consumer surplus and R(q) their
monetary payments) and the social value of tax savings (1 + )R(q) (where  is the shadow
cost of public funds). The expected (utilitarian) social welfare is then :
W  [V (q)  (1 + ) (t+ C(; e;q))] + U
This analytical framework captures most of the eight interactions that Kolm has listed in
his approach of the "incidence amont". It is assumed that the regulator does not observe the
variables  and e ; the asymmetric information is two dimensional since we have simultane-
ously adverse selection (lack of observability of the exogenous variable ) and moral hazard
(lack of observability of the endogenous variable e). This corresponds to the channels (2), (6)
and (7) in his list. From the regulator's viewpoint, is drawn from a cumulative distribution
F () on
h
; 
i
with density f(). the regulator observe C and q (or equivalently, prices
54And more generally on the internal structure of the rm; the Averch and Johnson (1962)'s model
analysing the eect of rate of return regulation on input choices explore one such impact.
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p = (p1; p2; ::::; pK)). Note also that his channel (2) is also eective as W and U do not
coincide.
The optimal regulatory policy is derived from the maximization ofW under incentive and
participation constraints. The two fundamental equations55 which summarize the essence of
such optimal second-best policy are the following :
 0(e) =  @C
@e
(; e;q)  
1 + 
F ()
f()
"
 00(e)
@E
@
(;C;q) +  0(e)
@2E
@@C
(;C;q)
@C
@e
(; e;q)
#
(11)
and
@V
@qk
(q) = (1 + )
@C
@qk
(; e;q) + 
F ()
f()
 0(e)
d
dqk
 
@E
@
(;C;q)
!
for all k = 1; :::; K
(12)
where E(;C;q) is the level of eort required for a rm of type  to produce q at cost
C. This set of rst order conditions illustrate how this (second-best) management policy
departs from the standard rst-best optimality conditions. Under symmetric information,
equations (11) and (12) simply describe equality between social costs and social benets
without any correction except for the second ones which is are modied Ramsey equations
if  is dierent from 0. Since the pricing dimension of the public policy has been our major
concern in this paper, let us focus on equations (1e) in the standard case i.e. the case of
private goods where in addition:
V (q) = S(q) + R(q) with R(q) =
KX
k=1
pkqk
i.e. under the assumption of linear prices. Since:
@S
@qk
(q) = pk for all k = 1; :::; K
equations (12) can be written :
pk+
 
pk +
KX
l=1
@pl
@qk
(q)ql
!
 (1+)@C
@qk
(; e;q) F ()
f()
 0(e)
d
dqk
 
@E
@
(;C;q)
!
= 0 for all k = 1; :::; K
or more compactly :
55This modern and syntheticapproach of the regulation of multiproduct natural monopolies is due to
Laont and Tirole (1990a,b).
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Lk = Rk + Ik for all k = 1; :::; K (13)
where :
Lk 
pk   @C@qk (; e;q)
pk
is commodity k's Lerner index.
Rk    
1 + 
 
KX
l=1
@pl
@qk
(q)
ql
pk
!
is commodity k's Ramsey index.
Ik 
"
F () 0(e)
(1 + )f()pk
#
d
dqk
 
@E
@
(;C;q)
!
is commodity k's incentive correction. Besides the addition of an incentive correction,
the pricing structure is determined by a familiar ramsey formula. This decomposition is
illuminating as it isolates the budgetary issue from the incentive correction and further points
out the parameters likely to shape their respective eects on the Lerner index i.e. departure
from the rst rule described in equations (13) i.e. marginal cost pricing56. This is of course
a very signicant progress with respect to the intuitions developed in Kolm's works as this
general theory is structural and is constructed from basic primitives. Equations () yield
another simple but important conclusion : incentives and pricing of good k are disconnected
if and only if d
dqk

@E
@
(;C;q)

= 0. Remember that in this general setting, the regulator can
use two instruments : a cost-reimbursement rule and a vector of (linear) prices. The optimal
price of good k exceeds its symmetric (Ramsey) information level i d
dqk

@E
@
(;C;q)

> 0
or equivalently57 i:
d
dqk
0@ @C@ (; e;q)
@C
@e
(; e;q)
1A > 0
Laont and Tirole call "incentive-pricing dichotomy" the situation where the incentive
issue is solved exclusively through the appropriate design of the cost-reimbursement rule. In
such environments, the two roles are distangled a single task is allocated to each instrument.
This of course implies some specic cost functions as demonstrated by Laont and Tirole.
56As explained in Laont and Tirole, it also oers a new perspective on the denition of cross-subsidization.
57See Laont and Tirole (1990a).
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It should be noted that the framework adopted by Laont and Tirole to formulate the
new issues raised by the regulation of multiproduct natural monopolies is in direct con-
tinuation of the normative approach privileged by Kolm and the French engineers. It is
just more complicated than the framework adopted by the precursors as new constraints
reecting incentive constraints, lack of commitment or political matters have been added
into the optimization problem. The optimal management rules derived in this second-best
environments are precise but often derived in a partial equilibrium framework and under
specic assumptions on the primitives. In contrast, the general second-best rules derived by
Guesnerie are derived in a general equilibrium setting but often take as given the scope of
the second best instruments. We have shown that Kolm was somewhere between the two
epochs. On one hand, he has continued on the road paved by his precursors enlarging the
cope of application of marginal cost pricing with an engineer avor but on the other hand he
has perceived and formulated many of the limits of that "doctrine" and anticipated many of
the developments which constitute the forefront of the contemporary approach to regulation.
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